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The aim of this article is to address the problem of what is usually called 
“self-consciousness” by studying Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic treatment of 
self-referential statements. Peirce believes that an adequate study of the mind 
requires “to reduce all mental action,” including “self-consciousness,” “to the 
formula of valid reasoning” (W 2:214, EP 1:30, 5:267, 1868) and its semei-
otic nature. While Peirce makes frequent use of the notion of “consciousness,” 
he is at the same time distant from the understanding of the “conscious mind” 
that Descartes invented and made canonical (e.g., W 1:491, 1866), and which 
from the modern epoch stretches out to the contemporary discussion on, as 
David Chalmers put it, the “hard problem” of the mind.1 In what follows, 
I argue that Peirce puts forth a powerful theory of self-consciousness based 
on his semeiotic understanding of self-reference and indexicality.2 To the 
question, “How can we elucidate the phenomenon of self-consciousness?”, 
we should answer, with Peirce, “What we call self-consciousness corresponds 
to the practice of narratives and descriptions ultimately based on indexical 
self-referential statements, which are in turn rooted in very specific dimen-
sions of human experience.” It is also important to underscore from the 
outset that the problem of indexical self-reference cannot be separated from 
Peirce’s concept of experience, which is one of the most interesting insights 
of Peirce’s philosophy and classical American pragmatism. In particular, it 
will be essential to see what are the experiential-perceptual conditions under 
which indexical self-referential statements can work as such.3
 Peirce scholarship has usually seen the problem of self-reference as a chap-
ter of the major metaphysical problem of individuation and has consequently 
dwelt with it in the light of this latter. It has been long claimed that Peirce’s 
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theory of human individuality is somehow troublesome. In a famous com-
ment, Richard J. Bernstein (“Action, Conduct” 90) writes that “the nature 
of human individuality always seemed to be a source of intellectual embar-
rassment for Peirce.” Although partially insightful, I take this statement to 
be highly problematical in two ways. First, what does “human individuality” 
mean? Second, once we have made clear what that phrase means, is there 
any conclusive evidence in Peirce’s thought for such interpretation? Let us 
leave the two questions open for now. There are three standard interpreta-
tions of Peirce’s philosophy that take Peirce to put forth a nihilistic doctrine 
of human individuality. One of these is provided by Bernstein (“Action, 
Conduct” 90–91), according to whom Peirce’s metaphysics cannot account 
for the originality and spontaneity, stemming from an “individual I,” that 
characterizes human agency. Similarly, Paul Weiss (134) maintains that for 
Peirce there are no real “individuals” and that what we call individuals are 
actually only the parts of bigger wholes. Finally, John F. Boler (142–44, 160) 
concludes from a compared study of Duns Scotus’s and Peirce’s metaphysi-
cal systems that Peirce cannot produce a genuine notion of “individuality” 
because he weds himself to a sort of Scotistic metaphysics but rejects at the 
same time Scotus’s notion of “contraction.” These three nihilistic interpreta-
tions rely on a series of famous passages in which Peirce prima facie seems 
to claim that (1) self-consciousness is not an original and intuitive power, or 
that (2) the existence of the human individual is not real apart from the social 
organism, or finally that (3) the metaphysical status of the individual self is 
nothing more than that of an error and ignorance bearer (e.g., CP 1.673; W 
2:200–04, EP 1:18–21, 1868; W 2:241–42, EP 1:55, 1868).
 A great deal of work has been done in order to show that Peirce does 
not hold such a nihilistic view. In particular, Vincent M. Colapietro’s 1989 
study is commonly considered the first groundbreaking work on this topic.4 
Further studies on Peirce’s notions of individuality and selfhood (Colapietro, 
“Toward a Pragmatic”; Delaney, “Peirce’s Critique”; Delaney, “Peirce’s Ac-
count”; Delaney, Science, Knowledge 130–56; DiLeo; Kemp-Pritchard; Har-
rison; Holmes; Riley; Maddalena 111–22; Michael; Muoio; Pape; Sorrell, 
“Peirce and a Pragmatic Reconception”; Sorrell, Representative Practices 33–75; 
Stephens; Thibaud; Menary; Uslucan; Magada-Ward; Robinson) have shown 
that the nihilistic interpretation of the self is a misunderstanding of Peirce’s 
thought.5 The common conclusion of these works can be summed up in the 
following statements: (i) Peirce’s alleged negative claims about the “self ” in-
tend to undermine a Cartesian, intuitionist conception of self-consciousness, 
and to replace it with a full-fledged inferential account of the operations of 
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the mind; (ii) the same claims underscore the developmental origin of the 
individual self-consciousness, which relies mainly (although not exclusively) 
upon social and linguistic dynamics; and finally (iii) the apparently ambigu-
ous place of individuality in Peirce’s metaphysics is due to his conception of 
individuality as a limit-case within continuity and as ultimately indivisible 
from continuity.
 Although all these studies provide essential insights into Peirce’s doctrine, 
I believe that they all rely on an ambiguous use of the notion of individuality. 
My overall interpretation is that Peirce’s doctrine of the human individual-
ity, or individual selfhood, is a complex one and has to be understood in a 
threefold way, so that every reference to only one of these three ways is a form 
of reduction of Peirce’s perspective:
(1) “Individuality” is the law-like continuity of a unique series of in-
stantiations that constitutes the reality of every human being.
(2) “Individuality” means the constant possibility in the mental life of 
adult human beings to refer to their empirical “I” through acts of 
self-reference and self-ascription of mental states.
(3) “Individuality” also refers to the unique mission to which a human 
being is called in the ongoing process of creation.
 In this article, I focus on the second point, that is, the problem of self-
reference, to which only an unsystematic attention has been given so far.6 
Can Peirce really be included in the list of philosophers who maintained what 
Peter Strawson called the “no-ownership” or “no-subject” doctrine of the self? 
(95 ff.). As I will show, a nihilistic interpretation of Peirce’s view on human 
individuality is untenable also from the perspective of self-reference. I take 
this to be an important endeavor since it has also been claimed recently that 
Peirce holds a nihilistic understanding of the individual self. In particular, 
Cornelis de Waal writes that according to Peirce, the individual human being 
is “wholly defined in terms of imperfections” (de Waal 154; see also Brown-
ing). As I will show, although de Waal’s interpretation relies on the genuine 
anti-individualistic tendency of Peirce’s theory of inquiry and metaphysics, a 
nihilist interpretation of Peirce’s doctrine of the self is partial and in the end 
misleading.
 Peirce’s often-quoted definition of the human being as a “sign develop-
ing according to the laws of inference” is already found in his 1868 “Some 
Consequences of Four Incapacities” (W 2:240; EP 1:53) and expresses a 
belief that will be maintained until his late writings. However, an analysis 
of his manuscripts shows that Peirce developed these ideas even before the 
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publication of that essay, as the 1965 Harvard Lectures and 1966 Lowell 
Lectures clearly prove. In particular, in Lowell Lecture XI, Peirce, at the end 
of his series of lectures on the “Logic of Science,” explicitly asks the question: 
“What is man?,” and articulates the same answer that he will include in “Some 
Consequences.” The problem of self-reference is a part of the anthropological 
question and the anthropological question is first and foremost, in Peirce’s 
terms, a logical question about the nature and classification of thinking.7 The 
fact that Peirce in his early writings defines logic as the science of the condi-
tions of the relation of symbols to their objects and that he concludes his 1966 
lectures on the logic of science with a thorough meditation on the symbolic 
nature of the human being should make us realize that Peirce stands on a 
somewhat unconventional ground in addressing the problem of the nature of 
the human mind. In other words, Peirce’s method of inquiry in philosophy 
of mind mainly coincides with his semeiotic logic right from his first steps. 
Therefore Peirce, while trying to give a “thoroughly unpsychological view of 
logic” (W 1:164), was at the same time settling a study of the mental life of 
the human being (and of self-consciousness, interpreted as self-reference, as 
a case of it) in semeiotic terms. This reading is confirmed by Peirce’s further 
inquiries, as it is witnessed, for instance, by his 1893 “Immortality in the 
Light of Synechism,” in which we read that the human being’s “spiritual 
consciousness” has the same nature of those “eternal verities” embodied in 
the rest of the universe as a whole (EP 2:3). “Verity” is first and foremost 
a logical notion, and is outside the epistemic boundaries of what is usually 
considered to be the adequate subject matter of philosophy of mind. On the 
contrary, Peirce thinks that the subject matter of logic overlaps with the sub-
ject matter of philosophy of mind, if we believe that human thinking is not 
reducible to its material instantiations and supports, that is, to its replicas, 
or to merely physical and biological semeiotic processes. For these reasons, 
I believe that an analysis of the logic of indexical self-referential statements, 
as the one provided in this article, is the best way to develop a philosophy of 
self-consciousness in a Peircean mood.
 Peirce’s theory of indexical reference can have a fundamental role in 
answering the problems arising from a Cartesian approach to self-reference. 
In particular, the presence of an indexical component in self-reference could 
very likely account for the directness of self-reference without resulting into 
a form of intuitionist introspectivism (Peirce’s theory of indexical reference 
does not entail intuitionism). At the same time, indexicality avoids the wide-
spread assumption that a full-fledged descriptive knowledge is the only way in 
which the term “I” can refer to the individual self. The question is therefore 
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whether self-referential statements are descriptive all the way through or if, on 
the contrary, indexicality plays some role in them. I will argue that in Peirce’s 
view, self-referential statements include an irreducible and non-descriptive 
indexical component.
 I proceed as follows. After providing a sketch of Peirce’s theory of the 
first-person pronoun “I” understood as a “rhematic indexical legisign,” I 
defend the claim that Peirce maintains that “I” has a real, non-fictional refer-
ent and that this referent coincides with a specific type of perception related 
to our consciousness of the present and our sense of effort in agency (the 
present&effort-perception).
II.
Although self-referential statements resort to different terms (i.e., the personal 
pronoun “I,” the possessive adjective “my,” or the possessive pronoun “mine”), 
I focus throughout this article on the use of the first-person pronoun “I,” and 
I take it as an example of what goes on also in the other cases. My claim is 
that an analysis of Peirce’s account of the meaning and the use of “I” is the 
best way to approach the study of self-reference in a Peircean mood. This ap-
proach coincides with Peirce’s externalist methodology in the study of mental 
phenomena (see Delaney, “Peirce’s Account”; Delaney, Science, Knowledge; 
Short, “Hypostatic Abstraction” for a slightly critical account of this; also 
Stephens), according to which an adequate inquiry into our mental states 
and powers requires an inferential approach from public, “external facts” (W 
2:214; EP 1:30).8 The linguistic production of self-referential statements is 
such a public and external phenomenon. However, let me make clear that, 
according to Peirce, the phenomenon of self-consciousness is not reducible 
to linguistic performances, although the linguistic practice of self-reference 
represents a big part of it; on the contrary, Peirce develops a broad semeiotic 
approach to the mental life, for which the signs implied in the phenomenon 
of self-consciousness also include non-linguistic signs, such as qualities of 
feelings and perceptions. As should be clear at the end of this article, the 
phenomenon of self-consciousness also entails experiential non-linguistic 
components. However, the importance of the focus on self-referential state-
ments (exemplified in this article) results from Peirce’s cautiousness to adopt 
a naïve introspective method of inquiry in philosophy of mind and his con-
sequent preference for an externalist approach.
 According to Peirce’s taxonomy, “I” falls under the class of “rhematic 
indexical legisigns.”9 As some scholars have shown (see, in particular, Agler; 
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also Boersema; Goudge; Pietarinen; Hilpinen; Maddalena, “Esperienza e 
soggettività” 41–56; Lizska; Pape; Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs; Thibaud; 
Weber), a rhematic indexical legisign (1) is a non-descriptive sign (e.g., EP 
2:342, 1905), (2) incorporates but does not reduce to the background or 
collateral factors necessary to the fixation of the reference (e.g., EP 2:494, 
1909), and (3) is directly referential. Moreover, (4) personal pronouns are 
indexical artificial types or legisigns and are therefore governed by social 
and linguistic conventions (e.g., EP 2:274, 297, 1903). In addition, (5) the 
singular object to which a rhematic indexical legisign refers does not need 
to be a real object but can also be a mere logical object, that is, it can have a 
merely “logical” existence (e.g., R 280:36–37) or membership to a Logical 
Universe whatsoever. From the first four points, it follows that “I” does not 
need to be a descriptive term in order to enable self-referential statements. 
But, we could still wonder, is the referent of “I” real merely in a “Universe of 
Discourse”? Indeed, point (5) entails that the referent of a rhematic indexical 
legisign can be a logically real object and nothing more. In addition to this, 
Peirce admits as real also the world of fictional objects, such as the heroes of 
literature, whose existence and features depend upon the deliberate creative 
activity of their authors (see, e.g., EP 2:209; 5:152, 1903; see Forster 100–01) 
and are logically localized in the Universe of artistic creation (and not in the 
Universe of non-fictional objects). In what follows, I argue that Peirce at-
tributes to the referent of “I” (what is eventually identified as the “private 
self ”) a stronger, not merely logical or fictional reality. In particular, I want 
to show that Peirce acknowledges a specific type of perception that consti-
tutes the fundamental collateral experience, and therefore the fundamental 
condition, for the indexical functioning of “I” as a truly referring term. This 
specific type of perception is what I call the present&effort-perception.10 It 
follows that it is this specific, complex perception that constitutes, in Peirce’s 
terms, the experiential ground on which self-reference can develop as point-
ing at a non-fictional reality. In this sense, the phaneroscopic givenness and 
unavoidableness of the present&effort-percept is crucial for the development 
of the private self and its characterization as a real, non-fictional object.
 Let me introduce my overall understanding of the present&effort-per-
ception. It seems to me that according to Peirce, the perceptual condition of 
self-reference has at least two forms. The first is what Peirce in his 1905 “Issues 
of Pragmaticism” calls the “conative externality of the Present.” In this light, 
a fundamental aspect of Peirce’s doctrine of the “I” is his phenomenology 
of time as an essential phenomenon for the constitution of personal experi-
ence. I will simply call this perception, following Peirce, the “insistence of 
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the present.” Although the structures of human “inwardness” have not been 
overlooked by Peirce scholarship,11 they have not been connected explicitly 
to the flow of time. However, in Peirce’s view, the insistence of the present 
is not the only perceptual basis for self-reference. The second experience is 
the perception of an initiative and causal efficacy in agency. Peirce identifies 
it with that part of the free will that is the “sense of effort.”12 I will call this 
second perception simply “sense of effort in agency.” Such position is under-
standable if we remind that Peirce puts forward a broad notion of “percep-
tion,” which is not limited to sense-organ perceptions and proprioceptive 
experience, and which relies on a broad phaneroscopic approach rather than 
assuming the viewpoint of the special sciences.13 Self-reference hits an existent 
target (what is hence called the “individual self ”) in virtue of a composite 
act of perception based on the insistence of the present and the sense of ef-
fort in agency. The “individual self ” has its birth contextually to the growth 
of the logical possibility of self-referential statements and finds its original, 
non-fictional ground in the present&effort-perception. Against any type of 
Cartesian intuitionist, immediatist, and innatist approach to the self, Peirce 
renews Fichte’s insight that the “self ” poses itself by thinking, on the basis 
a more original unity (in this case, the phenomenon of the insistence of the 
present and the sense of effort), the distinction between an “Ego” and a “Non-
Ego.”14 Let me put my thesis in the following way by using the terminology of 
Peirce’s theory of perception (see below): there is a composite “percept,” the 
present&effort-percept, which is at the origin of our perception of ourselves 
and which constitutes the existent referent of our indexical self-referential 
statements. All the narratives and descriptions of ourselves, in which we find 
the self-mediation of the person in the light of a growing reasonable ideal,15 
are ultimately rooted in this indexical self-reference. In what follows, I simply 
articulate this idea in greater detail.
 One of the clearest examples of Peirce’s account of time is found in 
the 1905 “Issues of Pragmaticism.” After providing a metaphysical account 
of the past and the future in modal terms, Peirce details a phaneroscopic 
and metaphysical theory of the present, according to which the present is 
the “conative externality” (something that presses and pushes) of the “Na-
scent State of the Actual” (EP 2:359, 5:462). This experience is the “living 
present” or the “Living Death” (EP 2:358) of what is actual. It coincides 
with the continuously perceived point in experience in which from the 
inevitable transformation of the present moment into a past event a new 
present emerges, in which “we are born anew” (EP 2:358, CP 5.459). In 
this context, Peirce observes:
Pluralist 10_2 text.indd   226 5/13/15   10:03 AM
stango : Peirce’s Theory of Indexical Self-Reference  227
What is the bearing of the Present instant upon conduct? Introspection 
is wholly a matter of inference. One is immediately conscious of his 
Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of an ego. The self is 
only inferred. (EP 2:359, CP 5.462)
 As we know, while the belief in the individual self, or the ego, is inferred 
(and therefore takes time and a whole set of conditions), the immediate “feel-
ing” of the instantaneous coming to being of a new actuality (= present) is 
not. I believe that Peirce’s seemingly random association of “introspection” 
and “Present” in this passage suggests that we have to look at the conscious-
ness of the present in order to have a better grasp of Peirce’s understanding 
of self-reference.
 Let me now turn to the second crucial instance of perception, the sense 
of effort in agency. Whereas the insistence of the present has a more passive 
connotation, the sense of effort in agency is more of the type of an active 
experience.16 When I speak of the sense of effort in agency, I mean that spe-
cific percept that arises from the human individual’s initiative, in which the 
immediate experience of one’s causal efficacy on something can be considered 
more crucial than the other experiential factors involved. It is the essentially 
dyadic experience that Peirce describes as “the sense of an opposing resistance 
then and there,” which is “entirely different from purpose, which is the idea 
of a possible general” (R 283:76; see also R 614:3; EP 2:383, 1906).17 This 
experience occurs at least in a twofold way. The first instance of the sense of 
effort in agency resides in the dialogic nature of semeiosis. In Peirce’s words, 
“the person is not absolutely an individual,” since “his thoughts are what 
he is saying to himself ” or “what (he) is saying to that other self that is just 
coming into life in the flow of time” (EP 2:338, 1905). In this case, thought 
has the nature of a “conversation” (EP 2:402, 1907) between an old, critical 
self and a new, emergent self, where the former tries to determine and per-
suade the latter to give its assent to something. This idea which prima facie 
seems to contradict the thesis that there is something like an individual self, 
simply points out the dialogical nature of the self, whose entire reality has an 
inferential and semeiotic structure. What is important to acknowledge here 
is that it is this dialogical structure that makes possible the sense of effort in 
agency, at least in one of its most basic forms. In this case, part of the self 
performs paradoxically (but interestingly) the function of that opposing “non-
Ego” (EP 2:154, 1903; EP 2:195, 1903; EP 2:268, 1903) against which the 
sense of effort is born. The second instance of the sense of effort in agency 
is more closely related to the bodily nature of the self. As an organism, the 
self can initiate a new movement and produce changes through a muscular 
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effort in itself (the “central body”) and in the surrounding environment (EP 
2:412–13, 1907).18 Also, in this second case, the experience is an internal 
reaction against an X, which is identified in its function of being a “non-Ego.” 
I quote at length a passage in which Peirce spells out what the sense of effort 
in agency is:
It may be said that there is no such phenomenon in the universe as 
brute force, or freedom of will, and nothing accidental. I do not assent 
to either opinion; but granting that both are correct, it still remains true 
that considering a single action by itself, apart from all others and, there-
fore, apart from the governing uniformity, it is in itself brute, whether 
it show brute force or not. I shall presently point out a sense in which it 
does display force. That it is possible for a phenomenon in some sense 
to present force to our notice without emphasizing any element of law, 
is familiar to everybody. We often regard our own exertions of will in 
that way. . . . It is not pretended that what is here termed is the whole 
phenomenon, but only an element of the phenomenon—so much as 
belongs to a particular place and time. That when more is taken into 
account, the observer finds himself in the real of law in every case, I 
fully admit. (CP 1.428)
 For Peirce, these two phenomena exemplify the most fundamental mo-
ments in which the human “force” or brute will is immediately perceived in 
initiating a new action (see CP 5.520).19
 But, we might ask, why should Peirce need to appeal to the present&effort-
perception in order to ground the possibility of self-reference? In particular, 
hasn’t Peirce made clear in his 1868 “Questions Concerning Certain Facul-
ties Claimed for Man” that at least the experience of ignorance and error is 
sufficient to give the start to the development of self-reference?20 In order to 
answer these questions, I will focus now on Peirce’s 1868 treatment of the 
development and nature of self-consciousness. If my reading is correct, the 
conclusion is that the phenomena considered in 1868 are not conclusive in 
order to grant that the referent of self-referential statements is a real, non-
fictional object. If we are seeking for a Peircean conclusive argument for the 
reality of the individual self, we have to look somewhere else.
 Let me consider the two phenomena at stake in “Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties.” The first phenomenon is the experience of ignorance and 
error. This case is crucial for the appearance of “self-consciousness,” namely, 
for the semeiotic process that leads to the development of the power of self-
reference. Peirce’s idea is that from a number of instances of error 1, 2, 3, . . . 
, n, the child abductively infers the existence of a private self, at first abstractly 
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grasped as “X responsible for ignorance and error.” In this case, the external 
facts from which the belief in the private self is inferred by a child are, on the 
one side, the agreement between people’s linguistic testimony about a certain 
state of affairs and the perception of that state of affairs, and, on the other 
side, the previous ignorance or different belief about the same state of affairs. 
“Abduction” is here an instance of creative formulation of a hypothesis of 
explanation, which is then deductively explicated and inductively confirmed 
through further experiences (e.g., W 2:218–19; EP 1:34–35, 1868). To my 
knowledge, Peirce does not mention explicitly what are the further experi-
ences that corroborate the belief in the private self. However, it follows from 
what he says that these experiences are at least further experiences of igno-
rance and error. The repeated contrast between the public “evidence of fact,” 
conveyed in linguistic testimony about a certain state of affairs, and one’s 
beliefs about the same state of affairs, keeps pointing at the reality of some-
thing like a “private” self and strengthens the probability of this conclusion. 
However, why cannot it be simply an abstract object, product of the human 
mind’s tendency to seek for an explanation at all costs? As a matter of fact, 
the mere logical existence of the private self in a highly probable explanatory 
hypothesis would still ground the possibility of the indexical use of the “I” 
in self-referential statements.
 The second phenomenon considered by Peirce is that the multifold of 
mental activity can be reduced to some sort of unity. In this case, perception 
refers first to different external facts and second to the subjective, mental 
powers that the human being can infer from those external facts. At a higher 
inferential level, the human being can also infer a further unitary mental 
power from the multifold “objects” of consciousness manifested in experi-
ence and their corresponding subjective modalities. In this case, abduction 
functions as a process of reduction of a multifold to a higher-order concep-
tual unity (e.g., W 2:217, EP 1:33). As in the first case, also in this case, 
the validity of the conceptual reduction requires inductive evidence, which 
is partially provided by the fact that this abductive operation of unification 
is always possible to the human being (at least, in normal conditions of 
mental development). In this sense, by questioning the arguments in favor 
of an “intuitive self-consciousness,” Peirce makes clear that it is because the 
individual self can be inferred from “every other fact” that the belief in its 
existence is close to certainty, and not because we have an intuitive power 
of self-knowledge (W 2:203–04, EP 1:20–21, 1868).21 This constant infer-
ential possibility counts as an inductive validation of the hypothesis in the 
existence of a private self. Furthermore, it is possible to say that the two types 
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of evidence that support the two cases of abduction work conjointly, so that 
the first abductive conclusion to the existence of a private self is supported 
by and supports in turn the second one. However, it still remains true that 
insofar as only these two phenomena are considered, we can take the referent 
of indexical self-ascriptions to be a merely logically real object represented in 
a highly probable hypothesis.
 The two cases just highlighted constitute a collateral experience suf-
ficiently strong to fix the self as a logically real object and to make of it the 
referent of the first-person pronoun “I.” However, insofar as the two phe-
nomena are the only background for the belief in the private self, it is still 
possible that the private self is only a logically real object, whose existence 
is limited to a specific Universe of Discourse (i.e., the explanatory context 
in which we seek for an explanation of the experiences of ignorance and 
error and the ubiquity of reflection in the mature mental life of human be-
ings). In other words, these two phenomena justify the conclusion that the 
referent of the term “I” is an existent object in the real, non-fictional world 
only in a weak sense. In an important essay, Thomas L. Short shows that 
the individuation of the self in the mental development of the child occurs 
as a hypostatic abstraction. Short addresses the question whether the object 
represented in the hypostatic abstraction, that is, the “self,” is real or not. For 
Short, the Peircean “self ” is “no more than a harmony of parts” (“Hypostatic 
Abstraction” 307). He adds that “one cannot dismiss such as self as unreal, 
since every entity of any degree of complexity whatsoever is itself real only 
insofar as its parts are organized by and subordinated to some law” (307). 
In addition, Short explains that for Peirce “the self is not a single, simple, 
stable entity, but is constantly in the process of being formed” (305). Short 
has the merit to avoid a nihilistic interpretation of Peirce’s theory of the self 
and to show its experiential and developmental nature. Nevertheless, it seems 
to me that Short’s interpretation does not grasp a core feature of Peirce’s ac-
count of self-reference. In fact, although Short refers to “self-consciousness” 
as a necessary condition for self-controlled behavior and growth, he seems 
to deny that self-consciousness displays an irreducible element of singular-
ity. On the contrary, in the very act of ascribing to oneself the more or less 
integrated harmony of one’s character, the human being is referring to a 
point of singularity. For Peirce, the indexical component in self-referential 
statements is precisely what accounts for this phenomenon. I believe that 
the present&effort-perception provides the perceptual ground on the basis 
of which self-reference refers to an existent object in the real, non-fictional 
world. If my interpretation is correct, the two cases treated in 1868 are not 
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the only ways in which genuine self-referential statements develop. In order to 
understand how “I” refers to a real, non-fictional object, the two 1868 theses 
must be read together with a third set of phenomena, that is, the conscious-
ness of the present and the sense of effort in agency. If it is the conjunction 
of these three phenomena that constitutes the complete collateral experi-
ence on which the existent referent of indexical self-ascriptions is fixed, it is 
only the present&effort-perception that plays the crucial role of a genuine 
indexical experience. The belief in one’s private self is introduced not only as 
the explanatory hypothesis of the experience of ignorance, or as the unitary 
condition of possibility of the ubiquity of reflection, but also as the natural 
interpretation of a recurrent perceptual experience.
III.
Before tackling the analysis of the present&effort-perception, we should 
consider some elements of Peirce’s theory of perception and phaneroscopy.22 
Let me start with perception. According to Peirce, perception is in a sense 
the epistemically fundamental operation, since all the concepts are acquired 
through it. Peirce acknowledges in perception three different factors, which 
are irreducible to each other even though they can only perform their func-
tion in connection, that is, the “percept,” the “percipuum” (sometimes also 
called “perceptual fact,” see CP 2.146) and the “perceptual judgment.” The 
percipuum is in turn a particular instance of perceptual judgment, being the 
immediate interpretative judgment of the percept (CP 7.643, 1903). Accord-
ing to Peirce’s analysis, the percept is the moment of immediate determina-
tion of the human consciousness, in which something is already affecting 
the capacity of feeling but is not yet a content of cognition (e.g., EP 2:4). 
Hence, “a percept contains only two kinds of elements, those of firstness and 
those of secondness” (CP 7.630). The percept is a “quality of feeling,” or a 
“quale-consciousness” (1stness) actualized as a modification of the human 
consciousness and hence acting as a compulsion (2ndness). Thus, “the percept 
is a single event happening hic et nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing 
its essential character. For it is an actual passage at arms between the non-
ego and the ego” (CP 2.146). On the other hand, the perceptual judgment 
(including in this sketch also the percipuum) represents the emergence of the 
element of generality implied in cognition (3rdness) right from its beginning. 
All the elements implied in perception follow a non-controlled dynamic:23 
although perception can be educated over time and is susceptible of criticism 
within certain limits, it is not controlled while it occurs. Furthermore, the 
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perceptual judgment has the formal structure of an abductive inference in 
which a general predicate synthesizes a manifold matter and has therefore a 
variable hypothetical logical force.24 The fundamental point to stress here is 
that although the perceptual judgment is an abductive inference, its logical 
force is particularly strong or “nearly approximating to necessary inference” 
(CP 4.541, 1906) as far as the attribution of “existence” is concerned. In-
deed, “existence” is for Peirce the first conception that performs the unifying 
function operating in perception. In a striking 1906 passage, Peirce links 
together the perceptual judgment and the abduction to the existence of an 
object. He writes:
[H]ow then is the Perceptual Judgment to be explained? In reply, I 
note that a percept cannot be dismissed at will, even from memory. 
. . . Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming that the perceiver is aware 
if this compulsion upon him. . . . Now existence means precisely the 
exercise of compulsion. Consequently, whatever feature of the percept 
is brought into relief by some association and this attains a logical posi-
tion like that of the observational premiss of an explaining Abduction, 
the attribution of Existence to it in the Perceptual Judgment is virtually 
and in an extended sense, a logical Abductive Inference nearly approxi-
mating to necessary inference. (CP 4.541, 1906)25
 Let me note two things about this passage. First, the “percept” does not 
have a cognitive status. We can have access to the percept as an isolated ele-
ment and talk about it only through an act of prescision. Technically speak-
ing, the percept coincides with an instance of brute experience and not with 
knowledge (see CP 6.336, 1906).26 Second, the concept of existence is at-
tributed to the “percept” through an abductive inference that has an almost 
necessary logical force. This constitutes the first moment of the percipuum, 
in which, although a perceptual judgment has not been fully developed yet, 
the percept has already entered the realm of cognition through an almost 
necessary abductive inference that states that there is something. Now, in 
considering the experiential conditions of self-referential operations, is there 
anything that resembles a perception of a self?
 I believe that the present&effort-perception plays this function in human 
life. In the two cases discussed in the 1868 article, the percepts involved are 
always withdrawn from the external, public world and do not refer directly to 
something like the self. In the first case, the percept is most likely the experi-
ence of the clash between an expectancy and someone’s linguistic testimony. 
However, in this case, it is still unclear why such experience should gener-
ate a new type of awareness, that is, self-awareness (“I am wrong”), instead 
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of a mere increase of information (“Someone or something is wrong”). In 
the second case, the percept is each one of the qualities of feeling actually 
present in our experience of “facts.” Nevertheless, this case only proves that 
reflection is inferential, while it is still possible that the higher-level process 
of abduction that gathers our mental faculties into unity is responsible for 
the creation of a “self ” in the same way in which a novelist creates the main 
character of a novel (that is, the self would simply be “logically” real). As 
a consequence, the self to which the personal pronoun “I” seems to refer 
on the basis of those two cases could be the product of a wrong or merely 
artistic hypothesis, although even at this level, the belief in the private self 
is supported by some evidence. On the contrary, if something such as the 
present&effort-perception is really occurring in experience, the percepts of 
that perception constitute a specific class of signs on the basis of which in-
dexical self-reference can be grounded in a stronger sense. As a consequence, 
not only the “private” self in its indexical dimension is something real, but it 
is also non-fictionally real, as distinct from what is the product of an artistic 
or literary act of creation: roughly put, while a fictional object becomes real 
as it is constructed by the regularities that the constructing mind puts into it 
deliberately, the present&effort-perception is unavoidably (= non-fictionally) 
occurring in experience as having certain phaneroscopic characters. When 
the present&effort-perception is put in connection with other experiences 
(first and foremost, the experience of error and ignorance and the ubiquitous 
possibility of reflection, the two cases discussed in 1868), it is finally fixed as 
the real, non-fictional object, the “individual self,” to which self-referential 
statements refer.
 It follows from this picture that two main aspects characterize the 
present&effort-perception, namely, “compulsion” and “inwardness.” The 
first character, compulsion, is an immediate experience of effort, resistance, 
and reaction against an X (which Peirce calls generically “non-Ego”). Peirce’s 
analysis shows that the concept of “individuality” is derived contextually with 
the concept of “relation” and that they are derived in turn from the dyadic, 
immediate experience of relation in its “dumb” force, or pure 2ndness. It is 
important to stress that at this level of analysis, we cannot say that the existence 
of two individual reagents is prior and that the dyadic experience of connec-
tion is secondary. On the contrary, Peirce’s phaneroscopic insight shows that 
the dyadic and “dumb” experience of compulsion, effort, and reaction is at the 
origin of the concept of individual reagents and is therefore phaneroscopically 
prior. We could say that the concepts of individuality and relation are contextu-
ally derived from a previous dumb experience of compulsion, effort, or reaction, 
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occurring as an undifferentiated whole. This point is even more instructive if 
we reflect on the fact that the object of the indexical self-reference must have 
some kind of individuality. Furthermore, Peirce often connects the notion of 
individuality to the notion of existence (e.g., EP 2:270–71, 1903; CP 1.432; 
CP 1.456; CP 1.457; CP 3.613). As a consequence, I am inclined to say that 
it is mainly from the compulsiveness of the present&effort-perception that 
human beings grow the notion of their existential individuality.
 The second characteristic of the present&effort-perception is inward-
ness. According to Peirce, although a perception brings with itself an almost 
immediate attribution of existence to the object perceived, the classification 
of the origin of the percept as “external” or “internal” is the less immedi-
ate inferential result of a series of experiential tests (CP 6.333–35). Peirce 
observes that “we are conscious of hitting and of getting hit, of meeting 
with a fact. But whether the activity is within or without we know only by 
secondary signs and not by original faculty of recognizing fact” (W 5:246, 
CP 1.366, 1885). In fact, the experience of compulsion and reaction could 
simply refer to the mere external contrast between a part of the environment 
and my body. On the contrary, the present&effort-percept results from the 
experience of a radical initiative in conduct, not from the reactive contact of 
the external physical environment with my body. For example, by describing 
an imaginary “dreamer” moving from sleep to wake, Peirce writes about the 
pure “sense of Reaction” occurring in experience as 2ndness:
[I]magine our dreamer suddenly to hear a loud and prolonged steam 
whistle. At the instant it begins, he is startled. He instinctively tries to 
get away; his hands go to his ears. It is not so much that it is unpleasing, 
but it forces itself so upon him. The instinctive resistance is a neces-
sary part of it: the man would not be sensible his will was not borne 
down, if he had no-assertion to be borne down. It is the same when 
we exert ourselves against outer resistance; except for that resistance we 
should not have anything upon which to exercise strength. This sense 
of acting and of being acted upon, which is our sense of the reality of 
things,—both of outward things and of ourselves,—may be called the 
sense of Reaction. . . . It essentially involves two things acting upon one 
another. (EP 2:4–5, c. 1894; see also the case of “surprise,” EP 2:195, 
CP 5.57–58, 1903)
 In this passage, there is no explicit reference to an experience of inward 
compulsion of reaction. From a general point of view, although the “sense 
of acting and being acted upon” can include something like an inner com-
pulsion, it does not entail it necessarily. The sense of compulsion taken in 
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its pureness can invariably refer to the resistance performed by the items of 
the internal world (such as in the case of the present&effort-perception) and 
by those of the external, physical world (such as in the case of the reaction 
between my body and the bodies around me). Similarly, in a 1906 passage, 
Peirce develops the phaneroscopic analysis of the notion of “action,” which 
echoes what he says about the “sense of Reaction.” He observes that “Action,” 
as a “surd dyadic relation,” entails an agent and a patient and can occur in the 
form of either an “active effort” or a “passive surprise” (EP 2:382–85, 1906), 
but does not mention the problem of the external or internal origin of the 
compulsion. According to Peirce’s theory of perception, then, the classifica-
tion of the percepts as “external” or “internal” pertains to the percipuum and 
the perceptual judgment and is not present at the level of the mere quality-
feeling (see DiLeo, “Peirce’s Haecceitism” 96–97). One must subject one’s 
perceptual experience to “various tests in order to ascertain whether it be of 
internal or of external provenance” (CP 6.333). Peirce proposes three tests. 
The first test is the test by “physical concomitance.” If the object that I infer 
from my percept (e.g., a tree) is also represented by a recording device (e.g., 
a camera that reproduces the tree in a picture), then there is an extremely 
high probability that the origin of the percept is external and consequently 
a very low probability that the origin is internal. The second test is the test 
by “experience of other observers,” including oneself at different times. In 
this case, if the object that I infer from my percept is also acknowledged by 
other observers or by myself at different times, then the reality of the percept 
is certified in its public nature, although the probabilities that its origin is 
internal or external are even. The third test is the test by “criticism of all the 
circumstances of apparition” of the percept, which also takes the form of 
“making a direct inward effort to suppress the apparition.” Let me apply the 
three tests to the present&effort-perception. If we have to recur to a “direct 
inward effort” in order to test any percept (third test), it follows that the effort 
to suppress the percept should also be directed to the present&effort-percept. 
According to Peirce, the consciousness of the present and the sense of effort 
in agency have an invincible insistency on us. Philosophically speaking, this 
fact is even more striking in the case of the sense of effort because the direct 
effort performed to suppress the apparition of the percept coincides in this 
case with the percept itself that is the target of the suppressing effort. The 
reality and insistency of the present&effort-percept is also confirmed by its 
unavoidability in each and all moments of our lives (second test). At the same 
time, it is neither possible to other observers to have experiential access to 
the same present&effort-percept (second test), nor to record it through an 
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external device (first test). In conclusion, the present&effort-percept should 
be classified in Peirce’s terms as deriving from an internal origin.
IV.
Let me conclude by summing up the elements involved in the present&effort-
perception and indexical self-reference from a logical, phaneroscopic, and 
metaphysical standpoint, in which we find the richness of Peirce’s approach. 
From a logical viewpoint, the quality-feeling (“percept”) of present&effort, 
as an actual determination of human consciousness, is a pure, genuine in-
dex, while the perceptual judgment that emerges from it brings with itself 
an element of generality that turns the pure index into a degenerate index 
(e.g., CP 8.266).27 The unifying function of the perceptual judgment is an 
instance of the synthesizing role of “conception” introduced by Peirce as 
early as 1867 in his “On a New List of Categories.” As in any other cogni-
tion, also in the case of perceptual judgment, the cognitive unification is 
imposed on a percept (the “manifold” of the impression) only because the 
percept teleologically calls for a certain type of unification.28 The possibility 
of self-reference through the personal pronoun “I” emerges therefore from 
the conjunction of the present&effort perception and the ability to master 
patterns of use of a natural language. According to my interpretation, the 
present&effort-percept is a “rhematic indexical sinsign” that grows into a 
“dicentic indexical sinsign” and eventually grounds the possibility of self-
reference by the use of the “rhematic indexical legisign” “I.”29 In other words, 
the present&effort-percept is the “Informational index” on the ground of 
which the “Monstrative index” “I” grows up and stands (see EP 2:172, 1903) 
as referring to a real, non-fictional singular object.30 From a phaneroscopic 
viewpoint, the present&effort-percept is a brute experience of compulsion, 
effort, and contrast, and is therefore an instance of pure 2ndness. In it, the 
mere possibility of consciousness (1stness) has become actual. The per-
ceptual judgment grows out of the percept as a synthesis of general traits 
(3rdness) and is characterized by a corresponding sense of specialization in 
one’s mental habits (e.g., EP 1:327–29, CP 6.145, 1892). From the logical 
and phaneroscopic standpoint, we see that the attribution of the concept 
“existence” to the present&effort-percept corresponds to the first moment in 
the development of the perceptual judgment and plays the role of an almost 
necessary logical quantification on that pure index or percept, so that its 
undifferentiated quality is already seen in the light of a promise of intelligi-
bility. Finally, from a metaphysical viewpoint, the percept corresponds to an 
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instantiation (actuality) of a mere possibility of instantiation (possibility or 
might-be), which grows into the general tendency and disposition (general-
ity or would-be) of a perceptual judgment and eventually of a habit, which 
is in this case, the habitual capacity of saying “I.”31
notes
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer, Ursula L. Roessiger, David W. Agler, Giovanni 
Maddalena, and Vincent M. Colapietro for their valuable comments on previous drafts 
of this article.
 1. Cf. Chalmers (200). While in the present article I will be mainly concerned with 
Peirce’s theory of indexial self-referential statements, I will also relate Peirce’s theory to 
contemporary debates and positions in the philosophy of mind in order to show how such 
debates are sometimes victim of a Cartesian prejudice and could benefit from a Peircean 
philosophical framework. Of course, a full-fledged refoundation of contemporary Car-
tesianism goes beyond the limited scope of the present article. For a convincing critical 
account of the Cartesian roots of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, see Rorty 
(17–70).
 2. In this article, “self-reference” is not the logical property of a statement that refers 
to itself (e.g., “this proposition is true”). Rather, I take “indexical self-reference” to be the 
description of the semeiotic structure of human self-consciousness. Peirce’s attempt to deal 
with self-consciousness in logical, or semeiotic terms, antedates the work of Hector-Neri 
Castañeda, who boldly stated in 1966 that his logical treatment of self-consciousness was 
“almost brand new” (51).
 3. Galen Strawson has recently stressed the (already Peircean) tenet that a study of the 
self should be based on the notion of “experience.” This is what he calls the “thin” or 
“live” conception of the subject of experience, according to which “no subject of experi-
ence exists unless experience exists for it to be the subject of” (208). This is the “synergy 
self,” “something that is essentially experientially live, something that exists only in the 
act or activity of experience” (209). This picture of the self must be preferred to an idea 
of the self as a structure opposed to or different from the course of experience itself. 
Though interesting for its experiential approach, G. Strawson’s contribution seems in 
the end to put forth an associationist, Humean conception of the self (212–14), which I 
believe Peirce would have strongly criticized as nominalistic. For a brief and clear sketch 
of Peirce’s rejection of Hume, see Roth.
 4. Short (“Hypostatic Abstraction” 308) and Lane (18) explicitly acknowledge this.
 5. I would like to spend a few words here on the most important recent essay on Peirce’s 
understanding of the self, namely De Tienne, “Peirce on the Symbolical Person.” De 
Tienne’s essay has several merits. First, it stresses that according to Peirce, the semeiotic 
approach (not the psychological, nor the neurophysiological, etc.) is the correct method 
in philosophy of mind. Second, De Tienne correctly stresses the developmental origin of 
the “person.” Third, he shows that Peirce, since his early writings, rejects Kant’s idea of the 
transcendental unity of apperception as the ground for accounting for the “consistency” of 
representations. (See also Gartenberg.) However, it seems to me that De Tienne overlooks 
the problem of the origin of self-consciousness, as if talking of the symbolic nature of 
“personality” could solve the problem of self-consciousness: that the human being is an 
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evolving sign and that his mental life ought to be studied semeiotically do not provide 
for an explanation of how that particular inference which is self-consciousness comes 
into being. That De Tienne overlooks this problem is proved by the fact that he focuses 
on “personality,” including higher-order personalities, without addressing the problem 
whether for Peirce higher-order personalities have something like self-consciousness (I 
would answer negatively; however, I cannot address this point here). In addition to this, 
De Tienne, in addressing the problem of self-conscious personality, puts the cart before 
the horse. He writes:
The general indetermination of a person refers to the very quality of its internal 
manifold. Let’s remember again the “New List of Categories” of 1867, in which 
Peirce described the manifold of substance in terms of “it,” in terms of “present 
in general,” and we shall have a beginning idea of the generality that characterizes 
every person as a representational agent. A person experiences itself at any moment 
as a present in general, that, as a general (this symbolical) representation of that 
connexity which is internal to its own manifold of more or less defined possibilities. 
(“Peirce on the Symbolical Person” 105–06)
 Now, as De Tienne knows perfectly, the confused unification of the phenomenon at 
the mere level of the “IT” excludes any reflexive reference to a self; on the contrary, De 
Tienne uses here phrases such as “a person experiences itself at any moment as a present 
in general” (emphasis added). Now, either we experience “a present in general” without 
any reference to us at the level of the “IT” (that could be eventually referred to us), or 
we attribute to us what was before experienced as a mere present in general, in which 
case we are attributing a description to ourselves. In the first case, the simple unification 
of experience is wrongly conceived as implying self-consciousness, while in the second 
case self-consciousness is only assumed, without explaining what its genesis is. It is for 
this reason, I believe, that new attention should be devoted to Peirce’s treatment of self-
consciousness.
 6. To be fair, Stephens deals explicitly with the problem of “psychological self-ascrip-
tions.” However, Hookway (26) claims: “It is rather surprising that Peirce does not of-
fer an account of our ordinary first-person avowals.” Although challenging, Hookway’s 
statement is wrong if it is taken to entail that Peirce did not address the topic of what 
we call self-referential statements. A striking example of the massive presence of this 
topic in Peirce’s thought is his constant reflection on self-control as one of the essential 
dimensions of human rationality. On human rationality, deliberation, and self-control, 
see Colapietro (“Peirce’s Guess”).
 7. This methodological point is particularly clear in Corrington (76): “The semiotic 
reconfiguration of methods of inference has direct implications for philosophical anthro-
pology. . . . [W]e can almost derive our anthropology from semiotics.”
 8. For contemporary externalist approaches in philosophy of mind, see, for example, 
Evans (225–35); Fernandez; Dretske. However, a clarification is needed here. Although I 
follow Delaney in characterizing Peirce’s method in philosophy of mind as “externalist,” 
it is necessary to remember that Peirce does not assume as epistemically prior or intuitive 
the distinction between the “internal” dimension of selfhood and the “external” world. 
As Peirce shows as early as 1865 in the first of the Harvard Lectures (W 1:167–68), the 
classification as “internal” or “external” of what is given is the hypothetical product of an 
inquiry, so that the distinction between the “internal” and the “external” world is more 
blurred that we usually believe. I believe that Wilson and Almeder are simply wrong in 
attributing to Peirce the naïve assumption of the “external” world of physical objects as 
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immediately given in experience, while I agree with Riley (“Existence”) in attributing to 
Peirce an inferential understanding of “internal” and “external” as class concepts. The 
same “externalist” method is used in the logical manuscripts collected in W 1, in which a 
classification of the arguments is pursued with no appeal to “introspection.” Therefore, it 
is in the light of this philosophical caution that we can use the notion of methodological 
“externalism,” which turns out to have here the simple meaning of a caveat in appealing 
to intuitive introspection as a method in philosophy of mind.
 9. Obviously, “I” can also be used as a common noun, or “rhematic symbolic legisign.” 
See, for example, R 668:16–17; R 649:36.
 10. Although a clumsy phrase, “present&effort-perception” has the advantage of clarity. 
Moreover, it avoids the introduction of a neologism to explain Peirce’s already idiosyn-
cratic terminology.
 11. See, in particular, Colapietro (”Inwardness and Autonomy”); DiLeo (“Peirce’s 
Haecceitism”) on this point.
 12. The “sense of effort” (2ndness) is only one dimension of the free will because 
the free will also entails self-control and therefore genuine knowledge (3rdness).
 13. Peirce reserves the same treatment to the notion of “experience,” as Cheryl Misak 
has amply shown. See, for example, Misak (“Peircean Account” 43–45); Misak (Verifi-
cationism 99–108); Misak (“C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters” 152–58).
 14. Although Corrington (76), following Colapietro’s idea of the “mind-as semeiosis” 
(”Inwardness and Autonomy” 493), gets Peirce exactly right when he interprets the “self ” 
in semeiotic terms as a “sign-using organism” of a special type, he fails to explain how 
such self comes into light contextually or together with that form of inferential indexical 
self-reference that I am presenting here. The fact that all the interpreters of the “Cogni-
tive Series” agree that “self-consciousness” is not intuitive but inferential does not imply, 
unfortunately, that they have made clear that for Peirce the self to which we inferentially 
get is not “already there” before the growth of indexical self-reference. On the contrary, 
the “self ” is constituted together with the development of indexical self-reference and 
the intelligence of its perceptual conditions. This is why in this article I prefer to talk of 
“self-reference” rather than simply of the “self.” Therefore, Corrington, among the others, 
does not follow through his own insight that “the self is temporal in its self-constitution” 
(96).
 15. Colapietro (“Inwardness and Autonomy”); Corrington; and Robinson all stress the 
evolutionary dynamic through which the self comes to embody more and more reason-
able ideals. Unfortunately, they do not anchor this dynamic in a clear semeiotic account 
of self-reference.
 16. Peirce foreshadows this point when he describes the “first” in human agency: “The 
first is agent, the second is patient, the third is the action by which the former influences 
the latter. Between the beginning as first, and the end as last, comes the process which 
leads from first to last” (W 6:173; EP 1:250, 1887–1888).
 17. Sometimes Peirce seems to deny that the sense of effort in agency and the con-
sciousness of the present are compatible. If this were true, my entire reading would be 
jeopardized. For instance, he writes in 1885 that “volition,” which is the “conscious-
ness of duality or dual consciousness,” “does not involve the sense of time (i.e., not of a 
continuum) but it does involve the sense of action and reaction” (W 5:225). However, a 
deeper understanding of this statement shows that what Peirce is claiming is that “voli-
tion” is a 2ndness and not a 3rdness. Similarly, the consciousness of the present does not 
entail a 3rdness insofar as it is the tense manifestation of the mode of actuality, which is 
2ndness.
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 18. Certainly, the acquaintance with that particular body that we end up taking to be 
“our” body plays an incredibly important function in the development of self-referential 
capacity. In other words, it constitutes part of the experiential collateral condition for 
the development of the use of “I” (see how crucial is the “central body” in Peirce’s treat-
ment of self-consciousness; W 2:202; EP 1:19–20, 1868). However, the fact that the 
acquaintance with one’s central body is crucial for the human mind does not imply that 
the referent of self-ascriptions is first and foremost, or essentially, the body.
 19. The obvious objection to my reading is that Peirce’s remarks about human “force” 
and “brute will” are usually extremely harsh. For instance, in CP 5.520, Peirce refers to 
the force of an agent as “sham” if compared to the “power” of agency, which is ultimately 
identifiable with “reasonableness,” “knowledge,” and “love.” In CP 1.673, Peirce mentions 
the need to “annihilate” our “blind will” (see also CP 8.81). Although from a general 
viewpoint, it is probably true that Peirce believes that the reasonable growth (3rdness) of 
the individual human beings in mutual communion is the most important point to make 
about the human condition, it is also true that overlooking the aspect of indexical self-
reference (2ndness) in Peirce’s account of the self results in a partial and less convincing 
interpretation of his theory as a whole. Although not central, Peirce’s theory of indexical 
self-reference is integral to the architecture of his conception of the self.
 20. In the manuscript “Questions on Reality” (W 2:162, 1868), Peirce claims that 
“error” and “ignorance” are what distinguish our empirical ego from the “absolute ego.” 
See also W 2:169, 192.
 21. Peirce provides here an extremely interesting argument against the Cartesian idea of 
an immediate and privileged access that the human being would have to the knowledge 
of his mind. That we can refer to our selves moving from “every other fact” (EP 2:21) 
does not imply that we have, in principle, a privileged access to the mind (a special type 
of immediate knowledge of it, as the Cartesian tradition would say), but only the empiri-
cal truth that every fact can virtually become the premise for inferring to self-referential 
statements. This point is very important given the Cartesian legacy that seems to char-
acterize the philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition. For instance, from a general 
viewpoint, there is a basic conviction that “self-knowledge is importantly different from 
the knowledge of the world external to one’s self ” (Gertler), which is to say that we have 
a privileged access to the knowledge of the mind, so that the knowledge of the “extra-
mental world” and the knowledge of the “mind” are different in principle. In the case 
of self-knowledge, the knower has a uniquely privileged epistemic access to the object, 
as it is exemplified by the “acquaintance” we have with ourselves in everything that is 
in a relation of presentation with us (e.g., Russell). As in the case of Descartes’s reduc-
tion of the mind to conscious “ideas,” some claim that the self is its conscious states and 
that some type of self-reference is always implied in each kind of content of conscious-
ness (e.g., Chisholm; Moran; Fumerton; Recanati). Our privileged access to our minds 
has also the epistemic consequence that in our grasp of our minds, we reach a level of 
“certainty” that is precluded to us in any other domain of knowledge. One recent ver-
sion of this special epistemology of mind is represented by the claim that at least some 
self-referential statements (i.e., present-tense self-ascriptions of psychological states) are 
immune to the error of reference through misidentification (Shoemaker; Evans; Prosser; 
and Recanati). It seems to me that the “Cartesian” approach is so rooted in the majority 
of the contemporary debates on self-knowledge that also those authors who refuse an 
intuitionistic account of self-knowledge tend to think that only a direct introspection 
can grasp something like a stable “ego.” Singularly, Elizabeth Anscombe has come to the 
conclusion that the term “I” is not a referring term because in order to be so, it would 
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need an unmistakable referent and therefore would presuppose a “Cartesian Ego” im-
mediately known in its essence as a res cogitans.
 22. The best overview of Peirce’s theory of perception is still Bernstein (“Peirce’s Theory 
of Perception”). Also Almeder (“Peirce’s Theory of Perception”); Delaney (Science, Knowl-
edge 118–29); and Rosenthal (“Peirce’s Pragmatic Account”) are enlightening analyses. 
Rosenthal (“Peirce’s Theory”) focuses on some distinctions within perception, namely 
“antecept,” “ponecept,” “antecipuum” and “ponecipuum,” which are not discussed in 
this paper since they do not add essential elements to my analysis of the present&effort-
perception.
 23. See, for example: “If one sees one cannot avoid the percept; and if one looks one 
cannot avoid the perceptual judgment” (CP 7.627).
 24. While in this article, I am stressing the indexical component of self-reference, 
we might still wonder what type of knowledge of ourselves is provided by the mere 
present&effort-perception, independently from further narratives and descriptions. The 
answer is explicitly (although succinctly) given by Peirce when he talks of “pure self-
consciousness” as an instance of the “most degenerate Thirdness” (EP 2:161, 1902): we 
know ourselves as a promise of growth and intelligibility, or, as Peirce puts it, “a mere 
feeling that has the dark instinct of being a germ of thought.”
 25. This analysis could be furthered through a study of the category “IT (also called 
“present in general” and “substance”) in Peirce’s “On a New List of Categories” (W 
2:49–59).
 26. See Delaney (Science, Knowledge 50).
 27. What Delaney (Science, Knowledge 129) says about the relation between “percep-
tion” and “science” can be said about the relation between indexical self-reference, on 
one side, and the growth of one’s self and one’s self-knowledge on the other side.
 28. Peirce’s understanding of semeiosis as teleological cannot be presented here. For 
a discussion of this point (which however seems sometimes to reduce the teleological 
nature of semeiosis to the fact that the individual interpreter has always a purpose in 
interpreting X), see at least Hulswit; Short (“Peirce’s Theory of Signs”).
 29. See Liszka (49–50).
 30. The importance of the present&effort-perception for Peirce’s theory of self-referential 
statements is highlighted by its contrast to John Campbell’s recent account of how the 
pronoun “I” refers. Campbell focuses on Anscombe’s thesis that “I” is not a referring term. 
He accepts the non-referring thesis only within certain limits, as an inevitable stage in the 
developmental process of self-reference. “Usually, we use a term the way we do because 
it stands for something. In the case of ‘I,’ the use comes first and we look for a reference 
afterwards; the use may even drive us to find a new kind of object, such as a soul, to act as 
reference for the term, rather than having the use grounded in a prior conception of the 
reference of the term” (Campbell 1). That is, at first the word “I” does not refer at all, and 
its use is made possible by a corresponding “token-reflexive rule,” for which “[a]ny token 
of ‘I’ refers to whoever produced it” (Campbell 7). Although not-referring, the term “I,” 
used on the basis of the token-reflexive rule, works as a “regulatory idea for the idea of 
reference of the first person, in directing us to find the thing—the self—that is dealt with 
by all our narratives of memory, by all out self-ascriptions of physical and psychological 
properties and so on” (Campbell 18). I think that this account of the use of “I” is highly 
questionable for at least two reasons. First, it has the hardly believable implication that a 
child would start to use the term “I” in a conscious way without referring at all. Second, 
it works on the unjustified assumption that the referent of a term can be only grasped in 
a descriptive fashion, as Campbell’s appeal to the role of the “narratives” and descriptions 
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of our lives seems to indicate. In his account, Campbell substitutes the possibility of an 
indexical self-reference with the view according to which in the early stages of our mental 
development we follow the linguistic pattern for the conscious use of “I” without referring 
to any experience. Why does Campbell commit himself to such a claim? The answer has 
to be found in his analysis of indexical reference and its perceptual conditions. According 
to the “model of perceptual demonstratives” endorsed by him, a genuine use of demon-
strative terms (indices) always involves not only the application of linguistic patterns but 
also the “perceptual identification of the object” to which the demonstratives refer. The 
perceptual experience performs the function of “singling out” the object “as figure from 
ground” (Campbell 11). What is missing in the use of “I” is a similar perceptual experience, 
so that only the linguistic pattern remains in the early instances of self-referential statements 
(Campbell 16–18). The reason why “introspection” as “sensory modality” does not work is 
that there is “no ground” against which the self can emerge as a “figure.” In my view, this 
idea of perception is a reduction of the perceptual experience to some sort of sense-organ 
perception and represents a strong reduction in comparison to Peirce’s perspective, which 
includes what I have called the present&effort-perception. As shown, Peirce’s acknowledg-
ment of the present&effort-perception offers the “ground” (in Campbell’s terminology) on 
which our indexical self-referential statements can find their individual, existent referent 
right from the dawn of self-consciousness.
 31. There are three objections that could be addressed to my interpretation. (1) The 
first is: “Why,” one might say, “does Peirce claim that self-consciousness develops in 
virtue of the experience of error if the ‘feelings’ of the present&effort-perception ac-
company the human being most likely right from the start of his conscious life?” I ac-
cept the objection as a further question on which more work is needed. However, let 
me just point out that Peirce’s perspective allows for an account of self-consciousness 
and private self that avoids both the extreme positions according to which, on the one 
side, self-consciousness is an original structure of the mental life that does not undergo 
any development; and, on the other side, self-consciousness and the private self are a 
fictional or social construction. The immediate “feeling,” or the present&effort-percept, 
is a phenomenon already present in the mental life of babies, but at that stage, it is not 
interpreted as the minimum referent of indexical self-referential statements until the 
organism has undergone a certain process of growth and social interaction. The second 
and third objections are objections of partiality. In fact, a full analysis of Peirce’s doctrine 
of self-reference should also take into account; (2) Peirce’s rejection of the Kantian “I 
think;” (3) Peirce’s belief that “corporate personalities” or higher-order consciousnesses 
are real. For reasons of space, I have to cut short with the discussion of points (2) and 
(3), on which however my reading seems to cast some light. On point (2), see Ishida; 
De Tienne (“Peirce’s Revolution”); Colapietro (“Toward a Pragmatic Conception”); Apel 
(Charles S. Peirce); Apel (“Transcendental Semiotic”); Harrison; Maddalena (“Peirce’s 
Incomplete”). On point (3), see Lane; de Waal.
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